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On the Causes of Unpredictability of Federal 
Circuit Decisions in Patent Cases 
Paul M. Janicke∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
¶1 In the realm of human dispute resolution, including the small segment thereof 
occupied by judicial decisions in lawsuits, a number of benefits come from being able to 
predict how courts will act.  Firms are aided in their business decisions relating to 
patents.  Lawyers are better enabled to advise clients on the impact of a particular course 
of action.  On the societal level, we feel a certain sense of added stability if we have a 
statutory legal system in which the outcome of disputed points is knowable, i.e., if we can 
tell which side is “right under the law.” 
¶2 In the sub-segment of our legal system occupied by patent law, the creation in 1982 
of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit was intended to bring doctrinal 
harmony, and the predictability that was thought to come with it, to patent law by having 
all appeals in cases arising under the patent laws heard in a single court.1  To some extent 
the court has been praised for having achieved the desired doctrinal consistency.2  The 
level of predictability for particular cases, however, remains disappointing.  The court has 
been increasingly criticized for inconsistency in applying the various rules of law it has 
promulgated.  Some attribute this phenomenon to inter-panel philosophical differences.3  
The critics complain that not enough respect is paid to a given precedent, and that various 
panels of the court have indulged in many devices by which to evade the impact of a 
 
∗  Professor of Law, Co-Director of the Institute for Intellectual Property & Information Law, University 
of Houston Law Center; pjanicke@uh.edu.  This work is based on an address to the American Intellectual 
Property Law Association at its October 2004 annual meeting in Washington, D.C. 
1 See, e.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1989); Paul M. Janicke, To Be Or Not To Be: The Long Gestation of the Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 69 ANTITRUST L.J. 645 (2001); Daniel J. Meador, A Challenge to Judicial 
Architecture: Modifying the Regional Design of the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 603, 611-12 
(1989); Paul R. Michel, The Challenge Ahead: Increasing Predictability in Federal Circuit Jurisprudence 
for the New Century, 43 AM. U. L. REV. 1231, 1233 (1994); S. Jay Plager, The United States Courts of 
Appeals, the Federal Circuit, and the Non-Regional Subject Matter Concept: Reflections on the Search for 
a Model, 39 AM. U. L. REV. 853 (1990); Ellen E. Sward & Rodney F. Page, The Federal Courts 
Improvement Act: A Practitioner’s Perspective, 33 AM. U. L. REV. 385 (1984); The Ninth Annual Judicial 
Conference of the United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, remarks of Frank P. Cihlar and Jack 
C. Goldstein, 94 F.R.D. 347, 392-412 (1982). 
2 See, e.g., Dreyfuss, supra note 1, at 74; Janicke, supra note 1, at 660. 
3 See, e.g., Pasquale A. Razzano (Ed.), Conflicts in Federal Circuit Patent Law Decisions, 11 FED. 
CIR. B.J. 723 (2001); R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Is the Federal Circuit Succeeding? An 
Empirical Assessment of Judicial Performance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1105 (2004).  But see Christian A. Chu, 
Empirical Analysis of the Federal Circuit’s Claim Construction Trends, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1075, 
1113 (2001) (concluding authorship has little to do with reversal rate for claim construction issues); Paul R. 
Michel, The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit Must Evolve to Meet the Challenges Ahead, 48 AM. 
U. L. REV. 1177, 1191 (1999) (characterizing panel-dependency assertions as exaggerated). 
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prior decision.4  Professor Polk Wagner of the University of Pennsylvania ascribes much 
of the current unpredictability to the varying decisional approaches used by the court’s 
judges, which he separates into the “procedural” approach (using fixed rules to reach a 
decision) or the “holistic” approach (general principles with few binding rules).5  He 
favors the former.  Other commentators have expressed the inter-judge differences in 
various ways.6  Some now suggest that the court may actually have gone too far in 
adopting detailed rules of law in the name of an elusive certainty, and that such rules may 
be counterproductive to a just and sensible patent jurisprudence.7 
¶3 This paper will present my own observations on this subject.  They are principally 
these: (1) as a cause of unpredictability, the effect of doctrinal inconsistency at the 
Federal Circuit is relatively small; (2) the underlying causes of the perceived doctrinal 
inconsistencies at the Federal Circuit are too varied to be categorized in any single 
formulation; and (3) the breadth and generality of the patent statute are the largest factors 
making the outcomes of particular patent litigations unpredictable. 
II. CAUSES OF INCONSISTENCIES 
A. The Patent Statute Contains Many General Standards 
¶4 Patent statutes in the United States have always been written in broad terms, 
leaving it to the courts to fill in details as cases arise.  The price for this developmental 
freedom is that the main issues in patent litigation are laden with generality, such that 
outcomes of particular cases must be, to a large extent, subjectively determined.  For 
example, a patent specification must enable a person skilled in the art to make and use the 
claimed subject matter.8  Enabled with how much effort, time, and cost?  To this general 
requirement, the courts have engrafted a slightly more specific standard of enablement: 
the person skilled in the art must not be put to “undue” experimentation.9  What is “due” 
 
4 See Matthew F. Weil & William C. Rooklidge, Stare Un-Decisis: The Sometimes Rough Treatment of 
Precedent in Federal Circuit Decision-Making, 80 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 791 (1998) 
(delineating seven judicial devices used by the court to avoid following its own precedent). 
5 See Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 3, at 1176 (arguing that the procedural methodology is better 
than the holistic one for the objective of achieving uniformity in patent law decisions). 
6 For example, Professor Craig Allen Nard of Marquette has addressed significant attention to what he 
calls “hyper-textualism” in some Federal Circuit claim construction decisions.  See Craig Allen Nard, A 
Theory of Claim Interpretation, 14 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1 (2000).  See also Weil & Rooklidge, supra note 4 
(setting out the many judicial devices the court’s panels have used to reduce or eliminate the impact of a 
prior panel decision). 
7 See, e.g., John R. Thomas, Formalism at the Federal Circuit, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 771 (2003) (arguing 
that rigid rules of decision are harmful to patent law development). 
8 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, provides: 
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of 
making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to 
which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth 
the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention. 
9 See, e.g., In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (“The determination of what constitutes 
undue experimentation in a given case requires the application of a standard of reasonableness, having due 
regard for the nature of the invention and the state of the art.”); Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Calgene, Inc., 188 
F.3d 1362, 1371-72 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[A]n enablement determination is made retrospectively, i.e., by 
looking back to the filing date of the patent application and determining whether undue experimentation 
would have been required to make and use the claimed invention at that time.”). 
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and “undue” is of course a judgment call, to be made by someone at some time.10  In 
another example of generality, only persons who made “an inventive contribution” to a 
claim should be named as inventors.11  This sounds straightforward, but after all these 
years we still have no formulation of what an inventive contribution is, other than at the 
polar extremes: someone who first conceived every aspect of a claim is an inventor, and 
someone who had nothing to do with the conception is not an inventor.12  A final example 
is that, according to the second paragraph of § 112, a claim must be definite in scope.13  
The statute does not say how precise the boundary limits must be, other than that it be 
“particular” and “distinct.”  The case law informs us only that the language should be as 
definite as possible under the circumstances.14  These types of provisions leave to the 
courts the difficult tasks of developing the patent law on a case-by-case basis, considering 
the evidence and the equities as shown by the record, as well as the intent behind the 
statutory provisions involved. 
¶5 There are many other examples of similarly broad generality in the patent statute.15  
Guidelines like these can hardly be expected to lead to predictability in the outcomes of 
 
10 Enablement is a question of law, but amenable to jury resolution.  Allen Organ Co. v. Kimball Intn’l, 
Inc., 839 F.2d 1556, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 850 (1988); BJ Servs. Co. v. Halliburton 
Energy Servs., 338 F.3d 1368, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
11 See, e.g., Eli Lilly & Co. v. Aradigm Corp., 376 F.3d 1352, 1358-59 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
12 See Fina Oil & Chem. Co. v. Ewen, 123 F.3d 1466, 1473 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (§ 116 “sets no explicit 
lower limit on the quantum or quality of inventive contribution required for a person to qualify as a joint 
inventor”). 
13 The second paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112 provides in part: “the specification shall conclude with one 
or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant 
regards as his invention.” 
14 We have actually seen from the court three different standards for compliance with this provision.  
First, the fixed boundaries standard: “Whether a claim is invalid for indefiniteness depends on whether 
those skilled in the art would understand the scope of the claim when the claim is read in light of the 
specification.”  N. Am. Vaccine, Inc. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 7 F.3d 1571, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1993), cert. 
denied, 511 U.S. 1069 (1994).  Second, the looser, best-you-can standard: “If the meaning of the term is 
discernible, even though the task may be formidable and the conclusion may be one over which reasonable 
persons will disagree, we have held the claim sufficiently clear to avoid invalidity on indefiniteness 
grounds.”  Exxon Research & Eng’g Co. v. United States, 265 F.3d 1371, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2001).  Third, the 
circular standard, i.e., if it complies, it complies: “Claims are often drafted using terminology that is not as 
precise or specific as it might be . . . As long as the result complies with the statutory requirement to 
‘particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention.’ 
35 U.S.C. § 112, para. 2, that practice is permissible.”  PPG Indus. v. Guardian Indus. Corp., 156 F.3d 
1351, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
15 For example, 35 U.S.C. § 101 provides that a “process” is eligible for patent protection, provided the 
other conditions of the statute are met.  Until 1998 it was unclear whether that term included non-technical 
processes, such as financial ones.  In that year, the Federal Circuit decided in State Street Bank v. Signature 
Financial Group, 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1093 (1999), that such methods 
could be useful and hence eligible for patenting.  As another example, filing of a patent application is 
barred where the claimed subject matter was described in a “printed publication” more than one year prior 
to the application filing date, 35 U.S.C. § 102(b), but the statute does not give any guidance on whether or 
when various items, like typewritten or web-posted materials or documents of restricted distribution, would 
qualify as printed publications.  See John E. Vick, Jr., Publish and Perish: The Printed Publication Bar to 
Patentability, 18 AIPLA Q.J. 235, 237 (1990) (discussing the treatment of typewritten materials, and noting 
the cases on printed publication in patent law “are inconsistent”); Frederick C. Williams, Giving Inter 
Partes Patent Reexamination a Chance to Work, 32 AIPLA Q.J. 265, 288-89 (2004) (taking the view that 
web-posted materials qualify as printed publications).  A third example: “Using” a patented invention is 
one of the acts of infringement set out in 35 U.S.C. § 271(a), but the issue of whether experimental use 
would be within that proscription remains unsettled outside the context of clinical trials for FDA approval 
purposes.  See Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1361-63 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (there is no experimental 
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court resolutions of the issues, yet I am not sure we want to make the patent statute much 
more specific, or whether we could in fact do so in a way that would be more helpful than 
harmful.  We probably will prefer the uncertainty. 
B. Mental States 
¶6 In addition to the pattern of generality in key terms of the patent statute, we have in 
the United States an extraordinary number of mental states built into both the statute and 
the case law.  I have argued that many of them are unnecessary to a modern commercial 
law,16 but no one seems prepared to do away with them.  Consider, to name just a few: 
mental conception and diligence as bearing on the date of invention;17 obviousness (an 
imaginary mental state, hence nearly always a subjective evaluation) of an invention as 
defeating patentability;18 willfulness as a trigger for enhanced damages;19 mental “error,” 
i.e., ignorance or oversight, needed for a patent to be reissued;20 and the intent-to-mislead 
 
use exemption from infringement in cases of universities using a patented invention for research).  In 
Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 27796 42-45 (Fed. Cir. 2003), Judge 
Newman in dissent indicated her continuing disagreement with the Madey holding. 
16 See Paul M. Janicke, Do We Really Need so Many Mental and Emotional States in United States 
Patent Law?, 8 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L. J. 279 (2000). 
17 See 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) (2005) (providing for establishing priority of invention by reference to 
conception date and, in some circumstances, by reference to diligence toward reducing to practice); Pfaff v. 
Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 60 (1998) (listing conception date as the basic invention date). 
18 See 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2005) (providing for unpatentability where the invention “would have been 
obvious at the time it was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the said subject matter 
pertains.”).  There are a few modern interpretations on the characteristics of this person of ordinary skill.  
See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 774 F.2d 448, 454 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (a person of ordinary 
skill in the art is “one who thinks along the line of conventional wisdom in the art and is not one who 
undertakes to innovate”); Endress + Hauser, Inc. v. Hawk Measurement Sys. Pty. Ltd., 122 F.3d 1040, 
1042 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (the person of ordinary skill in the art is “a theoretical construct . . .  and is not 
descriptive of some particular individual”).  Describing the level of skill in a workable manner for deciding 
cases is not easy.  In some cases the courts have characterized the level merely as “high.” See, e.g., In re 
Rouffet, 149 F.3d 1350, 1356-57 (Fed. Cir. 1998).  The often-mentioned Supreme Court three-part analysis 
of obviousness as given in Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966) is really not a test, because it 
does not generate any particular answer.  Rather, it is a methodology of thought that helpfully focuses the 
decider’s mind on the broad topics needing to be looked at in the course of reaching a decision.  At the end 
of the day, a subjective evaluation is necessary. 
19 The statutory provision, 35 U.S.C. § 284, states only that “the court may increase the damages up to 
three times the amount found or assessed.”  The courts were left to work out suitable criteria for exercising 
that authority.  Willful infringement has now become a prerequisite for a district court to increase damages.  
See Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 831 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (while other sanctions are available for 
litigation misconduct, “absent willful infringement there is no basis in this case for enhanced damages.”).  
Opinions of counsel are usually key in assessing absence of the mental state of willfulness.  Id.  The 
ramifications of opinions of counsel in this context were recently addressed in Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer 
Nutzfahrzeuge GMBH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 1337, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2004), holding, inter alia, that no 
adverse inference could be drawn from a party’s reliance on attorney-client privilege in refusing to divulge 
its counsel’s opinion. 
20 Reissue is allowed where “through error and without any deceptive intent” a patent’s claims are too 
broad or too narrow.  35 U.S.C. § 251 (2005).  The meaning of error in this context has been problematic.  
For example, in In re Weiler, 790 F.2d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1986), timely filed reissue application claims were 
properly rejected on the ground that they had been presented in a parent application and cancelled pursuant 
to restriction requirement.  A divisional application could have been filed at that time but was not.  The 
court held this was not the kind of error that would support reissue.  Id. at 1578.  The decision is part of an 
entire body of case law that has grown up around the idea that subject matter that was at one time claimed 
and later cancelled cannot be recaptured by reissue, because only oversight types of errors are embraced in 
the statutory term.  See T. Whitley Chandler, Prosecution History Estoppel, the Doctrine of Equivalents, 
Vol. 3:2] Paul M. Janicke 
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prong of inequitable conduct.21  These mental states consume a great deal of discovery 
time and cost, and on any given evidentiary record can come out either way depending on 
the assessment of the decider.  Do we have any right to expect high predictability within 
such a system? 
C. Unresolved Issues about Claim Scope 
¶7 Adding to the endemic level of unpredictability built into the patent statute, we also 
have the seemingly endless problems involved with formulating rules of law for 
determining patent claim scope, the central issue in most litigation today.  The court is 
currently addressing such formulations once again en banc in Phillips v. AWH Corp.22  
The uncertainty in adjudications of claim scope arises not due to philosophical 
differences among judges, but rather, to a large extent, it is an expected byproduct of a 
legal system that tries to express technical exclusivity with words.  Adjudication of claim 
scope is further complicated by lack of consensus about how much patent scope is good 
or just or right to grant.  To say that it depends on the scope “of the invention”23 is merely 
to restate the problem using even vaguer terms. 
¶8 In my view, the presence of such a large number of judgment-call criteria in the 
patent statute, and in some instances in long-established case precedents, is the main 
cause of unpredictability in modern Federal Circuit decisions.  That having been said, 
statutory generality and elusive mental states are not the whole story.  There are, to be 
sure, some cases in which the court might have done better.  We now address that 
subject. 
III. CONTEXTS OF NON-ENDEMIC UNCERTAINTY PROBLEMS 
A. Precedent Volume 
¶9 There are undoubtedly a number of situations in which, even given the subjectivity 
of the patent statute and of many long-established case-law doctrines, the court has issued 
decisions and later failed to follow them.  We now examine some cases where that has 
occurred.  To put our examination in context, some statistics are in order.  From its 
inception, the court has had twelve active judgeships.24  There are also a small number of 
 
and the Scope of Patents, 13 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 465, 514-19 (2000). 
21 See, e.g., Catalina Lighting, Inc. v. Lamps Plus, Inc., 295 F.3d 1277, 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (intent to 
deceive cannot be inferred solely from the fact that information was not disclosed; there must be a factual 
basis for a finding of deceptive intent); Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 
876 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (clarifying that intent to mislead is required for inequitable conduct defense and must 
be proved by clear and convincing evidence). 
22 Phillips v. AWH Corp., 376 F.3d 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (order granting en banc rehearing).  The court 
posed questions—some with several parts—on the correct methodology for interpreting claims, and a 
seventh question concerning whether some degree of deference should be given to the rulings of district 
courts on claim construction. 
23 See, e.g., Smith v. Snow, 294 U.S. 1, 14 (1935) (if a patent claim is susceptible to two constructions, 
“that should be adopted which will secure to the patentee his actual invention”); Vehicular Techs. Corp. v. 
Titan Wheel Int’l Inc., 141 F.3d 1084, 1091 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (discussing party’s argument concerning “true 
invention”). 
24 See 28 U.S.C. § 44 (2005), allocating twelve judges to the Federal Circuit, a number that was 
inherited from the two courts that were merged to form the Federal Circuit in 1982.  See Pub. L. 97-164, § 
165. 
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senior judges, typically three or four, who function in the same manner as the fully active 
judges, sitting on panels and authoring opinions.  In the beginning, the court adopted the 
patent-law precedents of its predecessor courts, the Court of Claims and the Court of 
Customs and Patent Appeals (“CCPA”).25  By today’s standards, this was not very much 
material.  The CCPA dealt mainly with the types of patentability issues that frequently 
came up from the PTO, i.e., rejections for obviousness or lack of novelty based on 
published references, double patenting, and inadequate disclosure, and with priority 
contests in the form of interference proceedings.  It was seldom called upon to resolve 
issues of public use, the on-sale bar, or inequitable conduct, and it never adjudicated 
infringement issues, damages, or injunctions.  The Court of Claims did handle some 
infringement and compensation issues where the government or its contractors were 
charged with infringing a patent, but the volume of such decisions was only about 
twenty-five per year.26 
¶10 From this modest base, patent law precedent began to grow rapidly after the new 
court was in operation.  By 1988 the Federal Circuit was receiving 301 patent appeals 
from the district courts,27 a number that has now risen to 467 as of the end of 2003.28  
Patent appeals from the PTO continued to arrive as before, including another seventy 
filings per year.29  Professor Chisum’s cumulative digest of Federal Circuit patent cases 
has grown to the point where the case digests now occupy 2146 pages.30 
¶11 This is a lot of precedent, over two thousand patent cases.  For the entire twenty-
two year period just prior to the creation of the Federal Circuit, the largest patent output 
from a single circuit was 372 from the Seventh Circuit.31  Following one’s own precedent 
was easier then.  Given this large volume of now-existing Federal Circuit precedent, it 
may be understandable if a panel of the court occasionally speaks inconsistently with 
another panel in another case. 
B. We Are Not Alone: Worries about Judicial Inconsistencies in Other Areas of Law 
¶12 Sometimes in studying a court’s output of judicial opinions one can easily lose a 
sense of context.  Courts are, after all, human institutions.  As such, we should not expect 
them to be perfect.  Criticisms of other courts for inconsistency in other areas of law 
 
25 South Corp. v. United States, 690 F.2d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1982) (adopting as precedent the decisions of 
the two predecessor courts). 
26 A Lexis search for Court of Claims patent decisions in the three-year period 1979-81 yielded seventy-
five decisions. 
27 Administrative Office of U.S. Courts, Judicial Facts and Figures, Table 1.5, Federal Circuit Appeals 
Filed (By Agency), 1988-2003, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judicialfactsfigures/contents.html 
(last visited Apr. 7, 2005). 
28 See Table B-8 Statistical Tables for the Federal Judiciary, at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/judiciary2003/dectables/B08Dec03.pdf (last visited Apr. 7, 2005).  Not all of 
these appeals were disposed of by judicial action.  The court’s report to the Administrative Office of U.S. 
Courts indicates that its judges disposed of 445 patent appeals from district courts in 2003, along with fifty 
appeals from the PTO, most of which were on the patent side.  Id.  Judicial action in the form of an opinion 
was seen in about 140 cases, 100 of them precedential.  The court also issues approximately sixty summary 
affirmances each year. 
29 Id. 
30 See DONALD S. CHISUM, 2004 PATENT LAW DIGEST (Matthew Bender & Co. 2004). 
31 LEXIS search, PATENT library, FEDCTS file, performed September 15, 2004.  The search terms 
were designed to collect all reported appellate patent decisions in the period 1960-1981. 
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abound in the literature.  One critic is the United States Supreme Court itself, which 
noted the need to remove tensions and discrepancies that had resulted from inconsistent 
application of the admiralty statutes.32  In a recent commentary on the doctrine of forum 
non conveniens, the authors note that Congress has never limited the doctrine, and as a 
result, “[t]he pervasiveness of the problem is marked not only by division among the 
circuits, but also by seemingly inconsistent decisions within individual circuits.”33 
¶13 In antitrust law, especially as applied to professional sports, inconsistency of 
judicial decision-making is an acknowledged problem: 
Antitrust law has had an enormous influence on the evolution of the 
professional sports business over the last two decades.  Haphazard and 
inconsistent decisions applying section 1 of the Sherman Act to league 
governance rules and practices, such as rules by which leagues control the 
ownership, number, and location of their member franchises, have left 
leagues confused.34 
¶14 In the realm of environmental law and its interface with corporate law, a recent 
casenote writer says: 
The importance of a unified method of regulating the environment is self-
evident.  . . . If a corporation cannot accurately estimate its liabilities, it 
cannot adequately plan for the future.  Inconsistent decisions are the result 
of state courts attempting to manipulate corporate law to cover an area that 
it was not designed to cover.35 
¶15 In the field of English criminal law as applied to physicians, we find this critique: 
“How should English criminal law treat well-meaning doctors who intentionally shorten 
the lives of suffering patients? The doctrine of double effect is irrational, impossible to 
reconcile with other aspects of criminal law, and produces inconsistent decisions.”36 
¶16 Clearly, inconsistent judicial results, or perceptions of them, are not unique to 
patent law administration.  Still, it might be helpful if we could identify some of the ways 
that certain criticized patent litigation results have come to pass.  We will consider four 
exemplar cases that have received commentator criticism, and will attempt to determine 
the extent to which the criticisms are justified.37 
 
32 See Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 401-02 (1970). 
33 Lonny S. Hoffman & Keith A Rowley, Forum Non Conveniens in Federal Statutory Cases, 49 
EMORY L.J. 1137, 1140 (2000). 
34 Gary R. Roberts, Reconciling Federal Labor and Antitrust Policy: The Special Case of Sports League 
Labor Market Restraints, 75 GEO. L.J. 19, 20 (1986). 
35 Shawn R. Farrell, Leo v. Kerr-McGee Chemical Corp.: Recognizing a Need for Congressional 
Reform in Toxic Tort Actions, 7 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 109, 126-27 (1996). 
36 Michael Watson, A Case of Medical Necessity?, 149 NEW LAW J. 863 (1999). 
37 For a larger selection of Federal Circuit cases involving conflicting precedents, see the analyses by 
Pasquale Razzano et al., supra note 3, at 762-64. 
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IV. FOUR CASE HISTORIES 
A. A Sensed Need to Provide a Remedy May Lead to an Unforeseen Result 
¶17 Many trial lawyers have observed that cases are won or lost primarily on the 
perceived equities, and that legal doctrines are often shoehorned to fit a perceived 
equitable need, especially where an individual plaintiff is litigating against a corporation 
of significant size.38  Put another way, hard cases may make bad law.  This sometimes 
happens at the Federal Circuit.  An example is Tronzo v. Biomet, Inc.,39 where the result 
would have to be classified as unpredictable. 
¶18 Dr. Tronzo sued Biomet in the Southern District of Florida, alleging patent 
infringement, trade secret misappropriation, fraud, and unjust enrichment.40  A jury found 
in his favor on all counts and awarded him $3,805,000 for patent infringement, 
$4,757,000 in compensatory and $15,000,000 in punitive damages for the breach of a 
confidential relationship, $7,134,000 in compensatory and $20,000,000 in punitive 
damages for fraud, and $4,750,000 in compensatory damages for unjust enrichment.41  
The district judge enhanced the patent infringement award by fifty percent for 
willfulness, dismissed the unjust enrichment count, entered judgment on the verdict for 
trade secret misappropriation, and capped the total recovery at a little over $7 million in 
compensatory damages and $20 million in punitive damages (including the enhanced 
portion of the patent damages).42  Biomet appealed from the judgment, urging that all 
relevant claims of the patent were either invalid or not infringed, and that for the other 
counts the compensatory damages award was unsustainable on the evidence.43  In the first 
appeal of the case (“Tronzo I”), the Federal Circuit agreed with Biomet and reversed as to 
the patent issues.44  With respect to the state law claims, the court set aside the 
compensatory damage award as lacking any logical nexus to Dr. Tronzo’s legal injuries 
and remanded to determine what other damages amount might be appropriate.45  On 
remand, the district judge found the evidence supported only $520 in compensatory 
damages.46  He then granted Biomet’s motion to set aside the $20 million punitive 
damage award, now seen as excessive in light of the greatly reduced compensatory 
figure.  He reset the punitive damages at 100 times the compensatory award, or 
$52,000.47  Tronzo appealed (“Tronzo II”). 
¶19 On the new appeal, the Federal Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Archer, agreed with 
the district judge’s decisions on the meager compensatory damages,48 but held that he 
 
38 See, e.g., Christopher S. Moffitt, U.S. Contractors in Chapter 11 Create a Collision of Two Worlds, 
THE NATIONAL LAW JOURNAL, May 23, 1988, at 5 (discussing how perceived equities influence outcomes 
of court cases); John E. Morris, Weak Case, Strong Appeal, THE RECORDER, Feb. 18, 1992, at 1 (discussing 
significance of a court’s perception of the equities). 
39 236 F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1035 (2001) [hereinafter Tronzo II]. 
40 Id. at 1344. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. at 1344-45. 
43 Id. at 1345. 
44 Id. 
45 Tronzo v. Biomet Inc., 156 F.3d 1154, 1160, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 1998) [hereinafter Tronzo I]. 
46 Tronzo II, 236 F.3d at 1345. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. at 1346-47. 
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should not have touched the punitive damages because “by failing to appeal the award of 
punitive damages in Tronzo I, Biomet waived this issue and was barred from raising it on 
remand.”49  This must have come as a startling result to Biomet, who undoubtedly 
thought that by successfully appealing the underlying issues of liability under the patent 
claim and compensatory damages under the other claims, the related punitive award must 
likewise be adjusted downward on the remand.  The district judge certainly thought so. 
¶20 Judge Archer explained the ruling by examining the issue of whether the amount of 
the punitive award “was an issue within the scope of the initial judgment of the district 
court,” because if it was, “it was necessarily incorporated within the scope of our 
mandate in Tronzo I and foreclosed from further review on remand.”50  No doubt the 
punitive award was in the judgment being appealed in Tronzo I.  But why should it have 
been beyond adjustment on remand?  One would think the punitive award, being closely 
and logically connected to the compensatory award, would have inherently been involved 
in the appeal, even though it was the underlying compensatory award that was the 
explicit target.  If one fell the other must fall.  Biomet may well have thought attacking 
the punitive award before the correct compensatory figure had been set would have been 
premature and formalistic.  This was not, however, the view of the Federal Circuit panel. 
¶21 According to the court, the punitive award was ripe for appeal, but Biomet did not 
mention it.  Therefore, any attack on that part of the judgment was waived.51  The opinion 
distinguished earlier cases where no waiver was found in situations where the district 
court had not yet ruled on a point.  Here, the district court had ruled.  Calling the 
appellate decision an application of “the mandate rule,” under which rulings not 
challenged on appeal are deemed waived, the court said Biomet could and should have 
challenged the punitive damages award as constitutionally excessive.52  The court pointed 
out that there was no strict numerical connection between the amount of the challenged 
compensatory damages and the amount of the punitive award; rather, the compensatory 
figure is only a guidepost to be considered in setting the punitive number.53  Therefore, 
Biomet was not safe in believing its challenge to the punitive award was preserved by 
challenging the compensatory underpinnings.  Thus, the $20 million punitive damages 
award was reinstated.54 
 
49 Id. at 1347. 
50 Id. at 1348. 
51 Id. at 1348-50. 
52 Id. at 1349. 
53 Id.  For this, the court cited and discussed the Supreme Court’s decision in BMW of North America 
Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996).  The case involved a purchaser of a new BMW who later found the car 
had been repainted prior to sale to correct for damage incurred in transportation from its manufacture 
location in Germany.  Gore sued for fraud under an Alabama statute which made suppression of a material 
fact actionable.  The jury returned a verdict against BMW for $4000 in compensatory damages and $4 
million in punitive damages.  Id. at 565.  Judgment was entered on the verdict and was affirmed by the 
Alabama Supreme Court.  Certiorari was granted to review the underlying Fourteenth Amendment issue of 
due process.  The Supreme Court found the judgment unconstitutionally excessive.  The main ground for 
the Court’s decision was the absence of extreme reprehensibility factors in the case.  See id. at 576-80.  A 
second ground discussed by the Court for judging unreasonableness was the ratio between the actual 
damages suffered and the punitive damages awarded, holding that the punitive portion must bear a 
reasonable relation to the actual harm suffered.  Id. at 580-81. 
54 Tronzo II, 236 F.3d at 1532. 
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¶22 Earlier articulations of the mandate rule had been much narrower in their bite.  For 
example, in Pelletier v. Zweifel,55 the Eleventh Circuit (whose law was supposed to apply 
here since the appeal was from a Florida district), had just a few years earlier said the 
mandate rule “simply means that ‘a district court is not free to deviate from the appellate 
court’s mandate.’”56 Biomet argued the district judge had not deviated.  The court of 
appeals stated in the first appeal decision that “the damages awarded thereunder are not 
commensurate with Dr. Tronzo’s injury,”57 meaning the district judge was to take 
whatever actions were needed to rectify that erroneous situation, which entailed resetting 
both types of damages.  But the appellate court did not see it that way.  It insisted Biomet 
should have attacked the punitive award even before knowing the legally correct amount 
of compensatory damages. 
¶23 Biomet should have prevailed on this point.  Until this time, the Federal Circuit had 
viewed its mandate simply as something to be complied with, i.e., a prohibition on the 
district court’s doing something inconsistent with the appellate court’s decision.58  
Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit and others had consistently held that the mandate rule did 
not impact matters not decided expressly or by necessary implication by the appellate 
tribunal.59  Moore’s Federal Practice suggests the district court’s discretion on these 
undecided points goes so far as to allow it to reach the same result that was reversed by 
the appellate court on other grounds: 
¶24 Although the district court owes obedience to the mandate of the appellate court, it 
retains discretion under the mandate rule to reconsider issues on remand that were not 
expressly or implicitly decided by the appellate court.  A district court can, after remand, 
come to the same result as before remand by relying on grounds other than those 
specified in the appellate court’s mandate.60 
¶25 The Federal Circuit’s invocation of the mandate rule here was out of accord with 
the reported prior precedents.  The amount of punitive damages had not been addressed 
by the court in the earlier appeal, either expressly or by necessary implication (except 
possibly the opposite implication, i.e., that it would need to be reset once the 
compensatory figure was known).  Resetting that number was in no way inconsistent with 
the decision in the first appeal. 
¶26 How to explain this result?  The most likely explanation is that the panel wanted to 
help out Dr. Tronzo, who had been through many years of emotionally draining litigation 
with Biomet, had partially prevailed, but had been unable to quantify the harm done to 
 
55 987 F.2d 716 (11th Cir. 1993) (citing Barber v. Int’l Bhd. of Boilermakers, 841 F.2d 1067, 1070 (11th 
Cir. 1988)). 
56 Id. at 718. 
57 Tronzo I, 156 F.3d at 1156. 
58 For example, in Exxon Chem. Patents v. Lubrizol Corp., 137 F.3d 1475 (Fed. Cir. 1998), the court, 
having reversed and rendered against Exxon in the first appeal, on literal infringement, now was asked to 
decide whether that precluded a new trial on infringement under the doctrine of equivalents.  The court held 
the mandate would not prevent such a trial, and that on remand “the district court is free to take any action 
that is consistent with the appellate mandate.”  Id. at 1484.  Similarly, in Laitram Corp. v. NEC Corp., 115 
F.2d 947, 951 (Fed. Cir. 1997), the court characterized its mandate as allowing the district court to “act on 
‘matters left open by the mandate.’” 
59 See Delong Equip. Co. v. Washington Mills Electro Minerals Corp., 990 F.2d 1186, 1196 (11th Cir. 
1993) (an appellate decision at an earlier stage represents law of the case only for such issues as were 
decided expressly or by necessary implication). 
60 18 JAMES. WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 134.23 [4] (2005). 
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him in any serious way—$520.  The perceived equities, equating to a basic sense of 
justice, often dictates how tribunals decide cases.  I believe that is what happened, and the 
case provides an insight into one way unpredictable results can occur. 
B. Longstanding Unresolved Differences among Judges over Written Description Bring 
an Unpredictable Outcome 
¶27 In some instances, the facts given by the court demonstrate that the court did not 
reach its result by employing strict rules of law as announced in prior cases; rather that 
unresolved philosophical differences among the judges probably drove the result.  An 
example is the holding of adequate supporting description in Union Oil Co. of California 
v. Atlantic Richfield Co.61  This case involved a gasoline additives patent held by the 
plaintiff Unocal, asserted to be infringed by the six refiner defendants.62  The claims 
defined the additive package in terms of six numerically limited parameters.  For 
example, in multiple dependent claim 117, which the majority opinion of Judge Rader 
treated as representative, the parameters were Reid Vapor pressure, fifty percent D-86 
distillation point [T50], ninety percent D-86 distillation point [T90], ten percent D-86 
distillation point [T10], paraffin content, and olefin content.63  The distillation points were 
recited as maxima (200 degrees F. for T50, 300 degrees F. for T90, and 158 degrees F. 
for T10) as were the Reid Vapor pressure (7.0) and the olefin content (less than four 
percent).64 The paraffin content was recited as a minimum value (greater than eighty-five 
percent).65  Based upon a jury verdict, the district court had held the claim was adequately 
supported by the written description in the specification.66  The Federal Circuit affirmed 
in a panel decision, rehearing in banc was denied, and the Supreme Court denied 
certiorari. 
¶28 The Federal Circuit majority opinion by Judge Rader tells us the patent 
specification described manipulating the above factors in various ways.67  This is true.  
But nowhere in the description is there anything that could be called a description of the 
combination, a pulling together, of the six values grouped together in the claim under 
consideration, which had been added after the application filing date.  For example, the 
court first notes that the specification teaches a desirable maintenance of T50 below 215 
degrees, and preferably below 195 degrees, whereas the claim specifies a 200-degree 
maximum, and that the Reid pressure should be below 8.0, but the claim says below 7.0.68 
¶29 The court tries to fill this void by picking and choosing from other passages in the  
lengthy specification.  Judge Rader tells us the T50 value of 200 degrees recited in the 
 
61 208 F.3d 989 (Fed. Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1183 (2001). 




66 35 U.S.C. § 112 provides in pertinent part: 
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and 
process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any 
person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make 
and use the same . . . . 
67 Union Oil, 208 F.3d at 993. 
68 Id. 
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claim is described at a particular place in the specification, but when you look there you 
find the following litany of possibilities: 
. . . the [T50] value usually is no greater than 215° F., e.g., no greater than 
210° F. but preferably is no greater than 205° F., e.g., less than 203° F., or 
less than 200° F., or less than 198° F., more preferably less than 195° F., 
e.g., less than 193° F., or less than 190° F. or less than 187° F., and most 
preferably less than 185° F., e.g., less than 183° F.  In general the fifty 
percent D-86 Distillation Point is above 170° F. and most often above 
180° F.69 
¶30 Here the paragraph ends.  It is true that 200 degrees is mentioned, but it is not 
combined with anything else.  To find another parameter value recited in the claim, a 
similar haystack would need to be invaded, and so on for all the parameters recited in the 
claim.  There was nothing pulling all the claimed elements together, i.e., no disclosure of 
the combination. 
¶31 Nevertheless, the majority found substantial evidence supporting the jury’s verdict 
of sufficient written description of a composition having the recited combination of 
properties.  To reach that result, the majority began with the familiar rule that claimed 
subject matter – here a family of compositions having six specified parameters – does not 
have to be described exactly in the specification.70  But if not exactly, what then?  Here 
the majority fell back to the psychological “possessed the invention” phraseology of 
some earlier cases.71  The trial evidence of such possession was expert testimony that the 
patent taught how to manipulate two or more of the parameters “in the prescribed 
fashion . . .”72  This sounds more like enablement than written description, a point 
deserving mention because of the long disagreement between groups of Federal Circuit 
judges about whether there is any separate written description requirement, apart from 
enablement, in the statute.  Judge Rader has been very outspoken on his view that there is 
no such requirement.73  Judge Lourie, who dissented here, has been equally adamant that 
there is.74 
¶32 The philosophical disagreement could well have been what led Judge Rader to see 
in the Unocal patent specification an adequate description supporting claim 117, and to 
Judge Lourie’s refusal to adopt that position.  Judge Lourie’s dissent pointed out that the 
 
69 U.S. Patent No. 5,288,393 (issued Feb. 22, 1994), col. 14 (Centigrade equivalents omitted). 
70 Union Oil, 208 F.3d at 997.  The court stated: “Appellant refiners assert that the specification does not 
describe the exact chemical component of each combination that falls within the range claims of the ‘393 
patent.  However, neither the Patent Act nor the case law of this court requires such detailed disclosure.” 
71 See, e.g., Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563-64 (Fed. Cir. 1991).  One may question the 
thinking behind the “possession” cases.  The written description does not have to tell us the scope of what 
the inventor personally developed.  That scope is most often determined by others, viz., the patent attorney, 
in light not of what the client did but of what the prior art will allow.  It therefore seems strange to judge 
claim scope by some sense of what the inventor in some sense possessed. 
72 Union Oil, 208 F.3d at 999. 
73 See, e.g., Judge Rader’s concurrence in Moba v. Diamond Automation, 325 F.3d 1306, 1322-24 (Fed. 
Cir. 2003), and his dissent from denial of rehearing en banc in Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 
375 F.3d 1303, 1307-12 (2004). 
74 See, e.g., Univ. of Rochester, 375 F.3d at 1305-07 (Lourie, J., concurring in the order denying 
rehearing). 
Vol. 3:2] Paul M. Janicke 
   105
majority was using enablement reasoning to decide a description question.75  He also 
delved at length into the failure of the specification to lay out the combination of 
parameters as claimed and its failure to indicate psychological possession of the claimed 
subject matter as of the filing date.76  His point was quintessentially simple: while it is 
true the description does not have to match the words of the claim precisely, “it must still 
describe the invention with all its claimed limitations in some manner.”77  The case turned 
out the way it did because the third panel member, Chief Judge Mayer, joined with Judge 
Rader and not with Judge Lourie. 
¶33 The majority and dissenting opinions in the Union Oil case, and the 
unpredictability of the outcome by traditional patent law analysis, illustrate the need to 
resolve these types of questions en banc.  Eliminating a separate description requirement 
would permit a patentee to file broadened claims without regard to traditional support 
requirements at any time during pendency of a chain of applications, provided she can 
come up with evidence of enablement.  On the other hand, those arguing for such a 
requirement should recognize the limitation it puts on patent applicants who want to 
change post-filing claim scope.  Where we are now is in a loose truce zone, where the 
requirement is officially with us, but some cases are seemingly decided as though it 
weren’t.  That does not make for good predictability. 
C. A Rule of Law May Take Some Time to Emerge 
¶34 Some of the cases for which the Federal Circuit has been accused of being 
inconsistent in following its own precedents – and hence being unpredictable – involve 
rules of law that have taken time to develop.  The example used here involves the mental 
state element needed to establish active inducement of infringement.  Section 271(b) 
simply says that “whoever actively induces infringement of a patent shall be liable as an 
infringer.”78  It leaves to the courts the job of fleshing out the provision, especially to 
determine exactly what mentality is involved in “actively inducing.” 
¶35 The court has vacillated on this issue.79  All the decisions seem to have agreed that 
the induced party must actually infringe.  In other words, an unsuccessful inducement 
effort is not actionable.80  It has also been agreed that some sort of mental state was 
needed to make the inducer liable.  For example, the accused inducing person had at least 
to know of the existence of the patent and what the induced party would do if the 
inducement were successful.  The more difficult question was whether she also had to 
know that what the induced party was about to do amounted legally to infringement.  
That question has proved more difficult to answer consistently. 
 
75 Union Oil, 208 F.3d at 1002 (Lourie, J., dissenting in part). 
76 Id. at 1002-03. 
77 Id. at 1003. 
78 35 U.S.C. 271(b) (2005). 
79 See Razzano, supra note 3. 
80 See, e.g., Moleculon Research Corp. v. CBS, Inc., 872 F.2d 407, 410 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (in the absence 
of direct infringement, defendant cannot be held liable for inducing infringement); Everpure, Inc. v. Cuno, 
Inc., 875 F.2d 300, 302 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (there can be neither contributory nor induced infringement when 
there has been no direct infringement); Arthur A. Collins, Inc. v. Northern Telecom Ltd., 216 F.3d 1042, 
1048 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (to establish inducement liability plaintiff must show direct infringement of the 
patents involved). 
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¶36 In its 1988 decision in Water Technologies, the court indicated that the inducer 
must act knowingly in the sense that she must know not only what the induced party is 
going to do, but that it amounts to infringement of a patent.81  Two years later, in Hewlett-
Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., the court’s language hinted that a lesser showing 
might be sufficient, namely “actual intent to cause the acts which constitute the 
infringement.”82  Later that same year, in Manville Sales, this was held not to be 
enough.83  Finally, as of 2003, it appears the issue may have finally been ruled upon in a 
way that will stick.  In Ferguson Beauregard/Logic Controls v. Mega Systems LLC, in 
which the patentee’s contention for inducement liability of a corporate officer of the 
infringing company was succinctly held untenable based on Manville Sales, which makes 
clear that “it must be established that the defendant possessed specific intent to encourage 
another’s infringement and not merely that the defendant had knowledge of the acts 
alleged to constitute infringement.”84 
¶37 In the years prior to 2003, precedents on this issue did not seem to crystallize 
sufficiently to allow for a consistent rule.  The issue was phrased too generally, not 
focusing on the kind of knowledge needed.  I think it is fair to expect that, for any judicial 
tribunal, there are certain points that take time to develop, and we may have to live with 
inconsistencies of pronouncements in the meantime. 
D. Sometimes the Ruling Is Doctrinally Right but Is Still Criticized as Wrong 
¶38 For those who believe they favor detailed, consistently applied rules of law in all 
patent cases and eschew the holistic judicial approach as fostering unpredictability, 
consider the main ruling in Exxon Chemical Patents Inc. v. Lubrizol Corp.85  Exxon’s 
patent claim was to a composition useful as an engine-oil additive package.  As set forth 
in a shorthand version by the court, representative claim 1 provided: 
a lubricating oil composition suitable as a crankcase lubricant in internal 
combustion engines comprising (1) a major amount of lubricating oil, (2) 
an ashless dispersant (i.e. one that neither contains nor is complexed with 
metal) in specified amounts of about 1 to 10 wt. %, (3) from about 0.01 to 
5.0 parts by weight of oil soluble ZDDP, (4) 5 to 500 parts per million by 
weight of added copper in the form of an oil soluble copper compound, 
and (5) magnesium or calcium detergent.86 
¶39 Thus, in addition to the oil, the claimed package had to contain four other 
ingredients.  The difficulty was that, depending upon the order of addition, some of these 
ingredients can interreact and exhaust one another, so that there is never a moment in 
time when all the recited ingredients exist together, i.e., were “com-posed.”  In other 
words, the claim calls for ingredients (1) through (5) to be in a composition; but if (2) and 
 
81 Water Technologies Corp. v. Calco, Ltd., 850 F.2d 660, 669 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 
82 882 F.2d 1556 (Fed. Cir. 1989). 
83 See Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount Sys., Inc., 917 F.2d 544, 551 (Fed. Cir. 1990). 
84 350 F.3d 1327, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
85 64 F.3d 1553 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
86 Id. at 1556 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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(3) react prior to the addition of (4), such that (2) is consumed in the reaction, then 
ingredients (2), (3), and (4) are never present together.  Lubrizol contended its 
manufacturing procedure was of that kind.  At trial, Exxon took the view that the claim 
was like “a recipe,” referring to the ingredient list of a typical recipe rather than the 
recipe’s steps, regardless of whether they were all intermixed and present at a given 
moment in time.87  The district court agreed.  The jury found infringement and judgment 
was entered accordingly.88  Lubrizol had contended, by contrast, that the claim required 
the ingredients to be physically present together in the finished product, a view rejected 
by the district court.89 
¶40 On appeal, the Federal Circuit adopted a claim construction similar to Lubrizol’s, 
except that the court said the ingredients did not have to exist together in the finished 
state.  Their presence together at any moment in time during the patent’s term would 
suffice.90  The problem was that the evidence apparently did not show there was any such 
moment.  As implemented by Lubrizol, some of the ingredients interreacted before all 
were in place, so there was never a time when all were composed, i.e., placed together, in 
the quantities recited in the claim.91 
¶41 The decision has been criticized,92 mainly on the ground that it placed too much 
stress on literality of the claim language and not enough on the basic sense of injustice 
the decision generates.  One does get the feeling that Lubrizol got a free ride because the 
Exxon claim was worded as a composition of starting ingredients, rather than, for 
example, a product by process (the product of mixing A, B, and C) or a method (process 
of preparing an oil additive package comprising the steps of introducing A into a 
container, introducing B, etc.). 
¶42 Notwithstanding these problems, the majority were, in my view, on solid doctrinal 
ground in the claim interpretation.  “Composition” derives from the Latin roots com and 
ponere, to place together.  Robinson’s treatise tells us that “[a] composition of matter is 
an instrument formed by the intermixture of two or more ingredients . . . .”93  In other 
 
87 Id. at 1555. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. 
90 Id. at 1557-58.  The court said: 
This conclusion respects that which is claimed, namely a chemical composition.  The chemical 
composition exists at the moment the ingredients are mixed together . . . [A]s properly 
interpreted, Exxon’s claims are to a composition that contains the specified ingredients at any 
time from the moment at which the ingredients are mixed together.  This interpretation of 
Exxon’s claims preserves their identity as product claims, and recognizes as a matter of 
chemistry that the composition exists from the moment created. 
Judge Nies dissented, taking the view that the district court’s broader interpretation was right. 
91 Id. at 1560. 
92 See Jason M. Okun, Note, To Thine Own Claim Be True: The Federal Circuit Disaster in Exxon 
Chemical Patents, Inc. v. Lubrizol Corp., 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 1335 (2000); Kelly Ann Casey, Recent 
Developments: Exxon Chemical Patents, Inc. v. Lubrizol Corp.: The Federal Circuit Sets Unreasonable 
Standards for Chemical Composition Inventions, 31 GA. L. REV. 1223, 1230-57 (1997); James B. Altman et 
al., The Law of Patent Claim Interpretation: The Revolution Isn’t Finished, 8 FED. CIR. B.J. 93, 105 (1998); 
John E. Tsavaris II, Sixth Annual Patent Prosecution Workshop: Advanced Claim and Amendment Writing: 
Claim Drafting in the Wake of Markman, at 7, 15 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, & Literary 
Property Course Handbook Series No. G4-3977, 1996) (noting that after Exxon Chemical “[e]very 
practitioner would do well to heed [the Exxon Chemical holding] because precision—now more than 
ever—is the hallmark of claim drafting”). 
93 ROBINSON ON PATENTS, as quoted in A. Deller, WALKER ON PATENTS, 126-27 (1964). 
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words, it is what you get when you mix two things together, not the unmixed set of 
ingredients.94 
¶43 The decision has been criticized as too rule-bound.  There were three opinions in 
the case, one from each panel member.  The principal one, based upon seniority, was by 
Judge Clevenger, a strong proceduralist in claim interpretation in Professor Wagner’s 
appraisal.95  We would expect a judge whose judicial methodology tends to be strongly 
associated with rules of decision to reach the conclusion he did.  Judge Plager, a swing 
judge leaning toward holistic in the Wagner-Petherbridge study, concurred in a separate 
opinion.  He was predictably concerned that the ruling would cause practical problems, in 
that available analytical techniques may have rendered impossible the detection of all 
ingredients together at one time,96 a concern one would expect from a holistically inclined 
judge.  Judge Nies dissented, expressing the view that the district judge’s interpretation 
was correct.97  She is not included in the Wagner-Petherbridge study because she died 
prior to the relevant data-collection period for the study. 
¶44 We are left with a highly criticized decision that is squarely in the center of 
established law from a rules-of-decision standpoint on the meaning of a composition 
claim,98 but which might have worked both an injustice to the patent owner and a more 
general damage to the patent system by setting traps for the unwary claim drafter.  The 
majority decision cannot, in my view, be categorized as a failure to follow precedent.  Its 
result might have been unpredictable – it certainly was to the district judge – but not for 
the Federal Circuit’s failure to apply traditional doctrine or precedent. 
¶45 Another aspect of the case met with a similar fate of rigid rule application.  Having 
found that Exxon’s trial evidence did not, under the correct claim interpretation now 
announced by the court of appeals, make out literal infringement, the court followed 
tradition and chose not to remand for a new trial under the correct claim interpretation.99  
 
94 See also, Shell Devel. Co. v. Watson, 149 F. Supp. 279, 280 (D.D.C. 1957) (the phrase composition 
of matter “covers all compositions of two or more substances and includes all composite articles”) (quoted 
in Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308 (1980)). 
95 See Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 3, at 1160. 
96 Exxon, 64 F.3d at 1562-63 (Plager, J. dissenting).  He gave the following thoughtful observation: 
There is testimony in the record that indicates that it is not known exactly how the chemical 
complexing, described in the opinion, actually works.  If this is so, then Exxon’s burden, to 
prove that the chemical ingredients exist at some point in the accused composition in the claimed 
proportions, may be impossible of accomplishment.  That could be said to argue in favor of an 
alternative construction of the claims, that what was meant was a process or product-by-process 
claim. 
97 Id. at 1563-70. 
98 I express no view here about whether the claim had novelty over the prior art.  The case has been 
criticized on that point as well.  See Jeffrey J. Phillips, Clean Air Never Smelled so Bad, 38 HOUS. L. REV. 
1557, 1573-76 (2002). 
99 Exxon, 64 F.3d at 1558-61.  In Jamesbury Corp. v. Litton Industrial Products, Inc., 756 F.2d 1556, 
1560 (Fed. Cir. 1985), the court explained when remand was proper and when not: 
Accordingly, we must determine whether there exists evidence of record upon which a jury 
might properly have returned a verdict in Litton’s favor when the correct legal standard is 
applied.  If there is not, Jamesbury was entitled to have the question removed from the jury and 
decided as a matter of law. 
See also Dana Corp. v. IPC Ltd. P’ship, 860 F.2d 415, 419 (Fed. Cir. 1988).  The problem, of 
course, is the clairvoyance and courage it expects of a litigant when the district court has adopted 
a claim construction as correct.  The litigant must not only foresee trouble in the court of 
appeals.  In order to avoid a reverse-and-render possibility, she must persuade the district judge 
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The court explained its refusal to remand by citing precedents that focused on the existing 
evidentiary record for making the decision whether a new trial is warranted.100  The 
problem here was not inconsistency with prior decisions, but with the settled rule of law 
itself.  It makes little sense to require litigants to foresee a claim interpretation that will, 
years later, emerge for the first time from the pens of judges of the court of appeals, and 
to put on their cases at trial under several alternate interpretations, under pain of reverse-
and-render if they fail to do so. 
¶46 The argument in favor of the traditional no-remand rule is that it promotes judicial 
efficiency by denying the parties a second day in court.  The rule says, in effect, he 
should have seen and used the right interpretation in the first trial; he has been heard, and 
this case is over.  Efficiency may be a desirable goal in general, but claim interpretation is 
so difficult to get right that the federal judiciary itself has been unequal to the task, with 
high reversal rates and even unresolved interpretative stances within the court of appeals 
itself.  Under these conditions, it seems very unfair to reverse and render, saying, in 
effect, the litigant should have known the correct interpretation and tried her case 
accordingly. 
¶47 Exxon is a case that has been criticized on both of the prongs discussed here, but is 
on solid precedential ground for both.  This suggests there can be too much deference to 
precedent as well as too little. 
V. CONCLUSION 
¶48 Has the court achieved the uniformity in patent law decisions that was sought when 
the court was created?  Most observers see a partial yes as the answer to that question.  
Achieving fine-point uniformity in patent law decisions might have been easier said in 
1982 than done today.  Back then, we had a poorly analyzed, sloganistic environment of 
patent case law.101  Now, while we have much more thoughtful analysis, we also have a 
rather large heap of Federal Circuit precedent in the form of thousands of decided cases 
with which to be consistent.  The court’s own developmental output has increased the 
chances for inconsistencies. 
¶49 In my view, we have on the major doctrinal points a very admirable level of 
uniformity.  Standards of review are uniform.  The approach to obviousness, once the 
central source of non-uniformity troubles, while perhaps still developing in its detail, is 
largely uniform at the macro level.  (The Supreme Court has not taken and decided an 
 
to allow her to present evidence, perhaps lengthy and technical, under a framework different 
from, and possibly antithetical to, what the district court has adopted as correct. 
100 The court said: 
When we determine on appeal, as a matter of law, that a trial judge has misinterpreted a patent 
claim, we independently construe the claim to determine its correct meaning, and then determine 
if the facts presented at trial can support the appealed judgment.  If not, we reverse the judgment 
below without remand for a second trial on the correct law.  . . . We ordinarily do the same thing 
in the appellate review of jury trial cases. 
Exxon, 64 F.3d at 1560. 
101 In Chief Judge Markey’s testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee’s Subcommittee on 
Improvements in Judicial Machinery in 1979, he said the “fundamental problem in patent law in this 
country” lies in the decision-making approach illustrated in court opinions “wherein nonstatutory slogans 
are employed and grow into mindless decisional rules for all cases.” Pat., Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 
No. 430 at A-1 (May 24, 1979). 
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obviousness case since the Federal Circuit was created.)  The allocation of decisional 
roles between judge and jury in the district courts is, in its main aspects, uniform.  We 
know the doctrine of equivalents is alive and well, and while we are wrestling with the 
finer points of what used to be called file wrapper estoppel as a brake on that doctrine, we 
all know there is such a brake and how it works in the most common prosecution 
situations.  We know, uniformly, a lot more about patent damages, injunctions, and issue 
preclusion.  We have a framework for analyzing inequitable conduct.  In addition to those 
mentioned, there are also many other uniformity achievements. 
¶50 The trouble, it seems to me, is that our appreciation of these achievements is 
obscured by diversity of thought about the new, finer questions invariably generated by 
those very achievements.  Realistically, that is the way it should be.  One can see the 
same developmental pattern with the Constitution, and even with the nation’s history as a 
whole.  The fact that new issues appear, and inconsistencies emerge at the micro level for 
a while, does not mean that the overall fabric is organically flawed.  It means the system 
is making progress, albeit imperfectly.
